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NOTE
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. and the Fate of the Perempto-
ry Challenge
Certain valuable talents possessed by effective litigators, such as
the gift of intuition or the ability to read the mood of a courtroom,
cannot be reduced to precise definition. These skills, whether innate
or born of years of trial experience, flourish in our adversarial system.
One of the most powerful procedural tools trial lawyers traditionally
have used to take advantage of such visceral abilities is the statutory
right' of the peremptory challenges Exercise of this right, which
allows the attorney to request discharge of a prospective juror without
cause during voir dire, is often premised upon no more than the
attorney's "gut feeling" about a potential juror's demeanor. With its
landmark 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky,3 the Supreme Court
considerably diminished the right to eliminate jurors in this manner.
More recently, the Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.5
1. The right to peremptory challenges is not secured by the Constitution, but granted
by statute or court rule. See United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1048 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Macke, 159 F.2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. El Rancho
Adolphus Prods., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 645, 649 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
2. Typically, three options are available to a party who wishes to challenge the
empanelment of a particular jury. The first, the challenge to the array, allows a party to
object if that party believes the pool of jurors chosen for the trial has been improperly
chosen or is improperly constituted. A challenge to the array may be grounded in
common law, in an alleged violation of a state or federal statute, or in an alleged violation
of the Constitution. JAMES J. GOBERT, JURY SELECTION 144 (2d ed. 1990); see, e.g.,
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (holding that common law requires jury to
represent cross-section of the community at large); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (construing U.S. CONST. amend. VI to require a jury that is a "air cross-section"
of the community). The second, the challenge for cause, may be raised to dismiss a panel
member for a specific reason, usually associated with the individual's ability to remain
impartial. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). The third option is that each party also
retains the right to use a limited number of peremptory challenges to remove potential
jurors without initially advancing any grounds for the strike. The number of peremptories
is normally determined by statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988); see also Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214-17 (1964) (discussing the evolution of peremptory challenges
in the state and federal systems), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See generally GOBERT, supra, at 143-314 (describing the three jury challenges available to
litigants).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. See infra notes 33, 111-30 and accompanying text.
5. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
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countenanced the continuing erosion of the once inviolable
peremptory challenge6 and perhaps moved one step closer to
relegating the peremptory to the status of an historical footnote.7
In J.E.B., the Court confronted the issue of whether the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment s restricts the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on the basis
of gender.9 Treating gender as a protected class,1" the majority held
that the use of peremptory challenges to effect gender discrimination
during the jury selection process is unconstitutional.
This Note addresses the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B., with
particular emphasis on the competing concerns of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and the judicial utility of the peremptory challenge
system. 2 After reviewing the facts and conclusions of the case, 3
the Note traces the evolution of two distinct yet interrelated lines of
Supreme Court precedent that constitute the substructure for the
Court's holding in J.E.B.1 4 The first series of cases addresses the
application of Fourteenth Amendment limitations on jury
qualification and selection, 5 including the Court's efforts to delineate
the implications of Batson in response to subsequent constitutional
challenges to the peremptory system. 6 The second line of cases
addresses the establishment of gender as a protected class under the
6. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 118-21 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing the venerable tradition of the peremptory challenge); Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-20
(tracing the history of the peremptory challenge).
7. See infra notes 243-72 and accompanying text.
8. "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
10. Most observers of the Supreme Court and, reluctantly, the Supreme Court Justices
themselves, describe current equal protection methodology as recognizing three "tiers" of
analysis. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
Courts apply the lower tier, often called "low level" or "rational basis" review, to state
actions that differentiate between classes of people on the basis of nonsuspect criteria. See
infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. Courts apply the upper tier review, or "strict
scrutiny" to state actions that classify on the basis of race or other "suspect" classes. See
infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. Although fraught with confusion, much of it
precipitated by the Court's own failure clearly to define the relevant criteria, observers
now identify an "intermediate" tier of equal protection review, reserved for classifications
based on gender and illegitimacy. See infra notes 171-210 and accompanying text.
11. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
12. See infra notes 243-72 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 21-74 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 75-210 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 75-165 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 131-65 and accompanying text.
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Fourteenth Amendment.'7 Next this Note discusses the fusion in
J.E.B. of the two lines of precedent and the scope of the inquiry that
litigants now may face when using peremptory strikes." It then
addresses the potential consequences of J.E.B. on the peremptory
challenge as a viable tool in the pretrial process.' Finally, the Note
predicts the Court's probable approach to future conflicts over the use
of peremptory challenges."
J.E.B. was a suit for child support and paternity filed on behalf
of the mother of a minor child.21 The State of Alabama used nine
of its ten statutory peremptory strikes to dismiss male jurors,' and
the defendant countered by using nine of his ten to exclude wom-
en.' Before empaneling the resulting all-female jury, the court
heard and rejected J.E.B.'s objection to the State's peremptory
strikes.2 4  J.E.B. argued that Batson v. Kentucky's' prohibition
against race-based peremptory strikes should be extended to bar
gender-based challenges. 26  Denying a post-judgment motion by
J.E.B. on the same issue, the district court restated that gender
discrimination did not fall within the scope of Batson.27 The
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld that ruling.' After the
Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari,2 9 the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether the Equal
Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of
gender as well as on the basis of race."3
By a vote of six to three,3' the Supreme Court reversed the
17. See infra notes 171-210 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 211-42 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 243-58 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 259-72 and accompanying text.
21. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
22. Id. at 1422.
23. Id. The original panel convened by the court included 36 prospective jurors, of
whom 12 were male and 24 were female. Two male jurors and one female juror were
excused for cause, leaving 10 male jurors remaining before the parties exercised their
peremptory challenges. Id. at 1421.
24. Id. at 1422.
25. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
26. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
27. Id.
28. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 606 So.2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
29. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., No. 1911717, 1992 Ala. LEXIS 1296, at *1 (Ala.
Oct. 23, 1992).
30. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
31. Id. at 1421. Joining in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion were Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg. Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion,
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judgment of the state court and remanded the case for a new trial.32
The majority predicated its reversal on an extension of its holding in
Batson, in which the court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit racially discriminatory challenges in the selection of the petit
jury.33 Sounding a theme that has been a crucial underpinning in
many of the Court's juror discrimination cases,' the J.E.B. Court
stated that "[d]iscrimination in jury selection, whether based on race
or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the
individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in
the judicial process."3  Noting both Batson's mandate for the
elimination of racial bias from the peremptory challenge phase of jury
selection 6 and the fundamental right of all citizens to participate in
the judicial system,37 the Court held that the same guarantees
necessarily apply in cases involving gender.38
In reaching its conclusion, the J.E.B. Court first invoked the
watershed decision in Strauder v. West Virginia,39 to support the
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment acts as a check on
discrimination in the jury selection process.' The majority noted
that the Strauder Court had purported to eliminate prohibitions only
against black male jurors, and expressly had refrained from extending
the right of jury service to women.41 The Court used this
and Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice
Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Scalia filed a separate dissenting opinion,
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. Id. For discussion of the
various opinions, see infra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 1430.
33. 1& at 1422-28.
34. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353 (1992); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,628 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406 (1990).
35. JE.B,, 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
36. Id. at 1430. The Court stated that "[a]s with race, the 'core guarantee of equal
protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate... would be meaningless
were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise
solely from the jurors' [gender].' " Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98
(1986) (alteration in original)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
40. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423. In striking down a West Virginia jury statute, the Court
in Strauder held that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment prescribed an affirmative
right to "exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society."
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08; see also infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (reviewing
Strauder's significance in connecting the Fourteenth Amendment to race-based juror
selection).
41. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423.
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observation as a springboard for an overview of the history of
prejudice against women in the federal and state courts.42  In
response to the State of Alabama's argument that " 'gender
discrimination in this country ... has never reached the level of
discrimination' against African-Americans,"'43 the Court then offered
a brief historical comparison of racial and gender discrimination in
jury selection.' The Court stated that it was ultimately unimportant
whether the level of bias experienced historically by women in
America approached that experienced by African Americans,45 but
42. Id. at 1423-24. In his caustic dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for
"treat[ing] itself to an extended discussion of the historic exclusion of women not only
from jury service but also from service at the bar (which is rather like jury service, in that
it involves going to the courthouse a lot)." Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia felt that because the case at hand addressed the right of a male defendant to claim
gender bias in the jury selection process, the majority's summary of discrimination against
women was irrelevant. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1425 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 9, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239)). Although the
Court tersely depicted the State's argument as a suggestion that gender bias "is tolerable
in the courtroom," J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425, Alabama, in fact, made an argument that
echoed the Court's own equal protection methodology. The state urged that
[w]hile there is indeed an extensive history of gender discrimination in this
country, it has never reached the level of discrimination which has historically
been exercised against African-Americans, and has not given rise to the strict
scrutiny of gender classifications which is granted to racial classifications.
Moreover, gender discrimination has historically been directed against women,
and not against men. J.E.B. should not now be able to claim heightened
protection for men in a realm in which such protection has thus far not been
granted to women.
Even though J.E.B. may have his cause examined with heightened,
intermediate scrutiny, the State's substantial interest.., in establishing paternity
of children withstands such scrutiny ....
Respondent's Brief at 9, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239).
44. Id.
45. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425. The Court was interested only in identifying the
parallels between the two categories of discrimination, not determining "whether women
or racial minorities have suffered more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during
the decades of our Nation's history." Id, The majority contended that similarities between
historical discrimination against women and against racial minorities outweigh the
dissimilarities "in some contexts," id. (citing Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-
Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1921 (1992)), but regrettably the
Court refrained from discussing how these instances of intersecting circumstances
specifically influence the exercise of heightened scrutiny. The Court has never defined
satisfactorily the rationale for subjecting gender distinctions to a different standard of
review than race. Predictably, the J.E.B. Court stopped just short of stating a
comprehensive rationale that lower courts might use as a guideline for their own decisions.
The Court instead relied on what amounts to a circular argument in support of the
existence of heightened scrutiny: "It is necessary only to acknowledge that 'our Nation
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination' ... a history which warrants
the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based classifications today." Id (quoting
1995]
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that it drew the analogy between race and gender discrimination only
to reaffirm that gender is a protected class under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
The majority found that, because gender is a protected class, the
primary question presented in J.E.B. was "whether discrimination on
the basis of gender in jury selection substantially furthers the State's
legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial. '47  The
State argued that there was a "special state interest in this case": the
determination of the paternity of a child born out of wedlock.48 The
Court rejected this argument, holding that the only valid state interest
at issue in a challenge to the peremptory strike system is the
achievement of a fair and impartial trial, 9 and that the State's use
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)). Perhaps one explanation of the
premise behind intermediate scrutiny is that
gender stereotypes, like race prejudice, warp legislative judgments. However, the
Court has refrained from applying to gender classifications the virtual per se rule
of invalidity it has applied to de jure race discrimination. This judgment
presumably reflects the view that even a legislature completely free of gender
prejudice would, on occasion, utilize gender classifications to achieve its goals.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 699 (2d ed. 1991).
Chief Justice Rehnquist would put more emphasis on the differences, and thus more
distance, between the two categories of discrimination; he urged that those distinctions
mandate a result contrary to the majority's extension of Batson. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434-
35 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
46. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425; see also infra notes 171-210 (tracing the evolution of the
"heightened scrutiny" analysis for state actions that effect differentiation on the basis of
gender).
47. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425-26 (footnote omitted). The Court recited the language
of its earlier decisions requiring "substantial" furthering of an important state interest
when addressing gender discrimination, but as Justice Rehnquist noted in Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190,220 (1976), this crucial terminology seems to have been plucked "out of thin
air." See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of Craig and the
Court's development of an intermediate scrutiny standard.
48. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 n.8.
49. Id. The Court found support, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 620 (1991), for the proposition that there was only one "legitimate interest [the state]
could possibly have in the exercise of its peremptory challenges." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426
n.8. But see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (discussing an alternate purpose
of the peremptory), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Edmonson
Court, however, had cited no source for this proposition. The Court typically canvasses
legislative history and other sources for the actual purpose of statutes in this context, but
often must hypothesize the purpose in the absence of evidence of clear legislative intent.
See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,186-877 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In J.E.B. and Edmonson, however, the Court seems to have made no effort
to research the various sources of the peremptory challenge to find a legislative purpose.
This arguably arbitrary narrowing of possible legislative purposes disturbed Justice
Scalia, who said of the majority's characterization of the peremptory's purpose in J.E.B.:
"It does not seem to me that even this premise is correct.... If the system of peremptory
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of peremptory strikes in this instance clearly did not further that
goal.5" Finally, the Court held that the exercise of peremptory
challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause in all cases where the
only rationale for the differentiation is gender"' because
"[d]iscrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on
gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the
individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in
the judicial process."' 2
In a concurrence that had the tone of a dissent, Justice O'Connor
focused at length upon what she termed the J.E.B. decision's "costs"
to the trial system, including procedural delay and the potential for
strikes affects the actual impartiality of the jury not a bit, but gives litigants a greater belief
in that impartiality, it serves a most important function." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 n.3
(Scalia ., dissenting). But see Fritz, 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the Court "must discover a correlation between the classification
and either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose that we may
reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature").
50. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426-27. The Court refused to accept the State's attempt to
justify its peremptory strikes on the basis of an alleged correlation between gender and
attitude toward paternity suits, noting that the State was "urg[ing] this Court to condone
the same stereotypes that justified the wholesale exclusion of women from juries and the
ballot box." Id. at 1427. The only justification that might have met with the Court's
approval would have been a showing that gender-based exclusions furthered the state's
objective of "securing a fair and impartial jury," id. at 1426 n.8, but it is difficult to imagine
a justification that would meet this narrow criterion.
51. Id. at 1429-30. The Court said that "[p]arties may still remove jurors whom they
feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a
proxy for bias." Id. at 1429. One of the difficulties in discussing peremptory strikes based
on race or gender is that two potential sources of bias in the courtroom are being
addressed simultaneously. First, and foremost in the Court's opinion in JE.B., is the
unconstitutionality of any prejudice on the part of an attorney in striking jurors from the
jury panel. Second, and still important to the Court, is the potential for bias by a jury
member. However, as noted above, the Court refuses to allow bare suspicion of the latter
type of bias to excuse peremptory strikes when the only basis for the suspicion is the
potential juror's sex. Cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). The Batson Court
held:
"Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the states to excludd black persons
from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve
as jurors ... so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption
that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is
black."
Id
52. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427. The Court was careful not to ground its decision solely
in either the harm discriminatory peremptory strikes cause to a litigant or in the harm
inflicted on a potential juror. This is consistent with Batson and other recent cases, and
may represent a tacit acknowledgement by the Court that neither of these individual
justifications for its decisions is altogether convincing. See infra notes 211-28 and
accompanying text.
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unchecked bias in jurors.53 Justice O'Connor agreed that gender
discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny, and that the
State of Alabama had not advanced a sufficient justification for its
strikes.' However, she cited the "costs" of the decision as support
for her belief that "the Equal Protection Clause does not limit the
exercise of peremptory challenges by private civil litigants and
criminal defendants,"55 a stance she originally espoused in Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co.56
Although he did not explicitly state his reasons for concurring
only in the judgment,57 Justice Kennedy seemed concerned primarily
with the inajority's analysis of the various lines of precedent.
Quoting the Equal Protection Clause itself, 59 Justice Kennedy
stressed the central importance of individual rights in equal protection
jurisprudence." Presumably, Justice Kennedy would have focused
almost entirely on the rights of excluded jurors, rather than those of
the litigants,6' in prohibiting gender-based peremptories.62
53. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra notes 243-58 and accompanying
text (discussing consequences of the decision in J.E.B. on trial procedures).
54. Id. at 1430-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1433 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. 500 U.S. 614, 632-33 (1991); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2363
(1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the unique adversarial relationship between
criminal defendants and the State which does not usually exist between the government
and private litigants). The decisions in Edmonson and McCollum extended Batson's
prohibition against race-based peremptory strikes by a state to include such strikes by civil
litigants and criminal defendants, respectively. See infra notes 144-65 and accompanying
text.
57. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy in fact stated that he was "in full agreement with the Court that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. I& at 1433 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 8.
60. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra note
10.
61. Presumably, Justice Kennedy felt that third-party standing rules afforded a litigant
the firmest ground from which to challenge the constitutionality of peremptory strikes.
Speaking for a majority of the Court in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991), Justice Kennedy explained that in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court
found that a "defendant may raise the excluded jurors' equal protection rights."
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618 (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 415); see also infra notes 146-55 and
accompanying text.
62. Justice Kennedy acknowledged the existence of an intermediate scrutiny standard
for gender classifications, but stated that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause and our
constitutional tradition are based on the theory that an individual possesses rights that are
protected against lawless action by the government." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433-34
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, found fault with the
majority's statement that Equal Protection concerns outweigh the
costs of limiting the use of peremptory challenges.63 While
acknowledging that Batson was a "sea-change" in the evolution of the
jury selection process, he nevertheless interpreted that case in part as
a recognition that "race lies at the core of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'6  He contended that the differences between race
and gender discrimination, and their corresponding standards of
review,6 meant "that the balance should tilt in favor of peremptory
challenges when sex, not race, is the issue."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas, also signed
the dissent of Justice Scalia, who wrote that the majority's "conclusion
can be reached only by focusing unrealistically upon the individual
exercises of the peremptory challenge, and ignoring the totality of the
practice." 67  In characteristically withering terms,' Justice Scalia
accused the majority of prohibiting gender-based peremptories
"simply to pay conspicuous obeisance to the equality of the sexes....
The Constitution of the United States neither requires nor permits
this vandalizing of our people's traditions., 69 Justice Scalia argued,
like Justice Kennedy, that the only constitutionally-cognizable harm
at issue in JE.B. was the wrong suffered by excluded male jurors.7
However, Justice Scalia, unlike Justice Kennedy, disagreed with the
"uniquely expansive third-party standing analysis" used by the Court
63. Id. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The majority stated that in assessing
the constitutionality of gender-based strikes, it did not "weigh the value of peremptory
challenges as an institution against [the Court's] asserted commitment to eradicate
invidious discrimination from the courtroom." Id at 1425-26. However, the Court's
decision, at a minimum, did require an implicit comparison of one facet of the traditional
peremptory "institution" with the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause; in that
respect at least, the Court determined that the concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment
certainly overpowered those of keeping the peremptory system intact.
64. Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 169-70, 206-10 (discussing equal protection
analysis of discrimination based on race and gender).
66. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
67. Id at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Justice Scalia also stated that the majority's opinion in J.E.B. was "an inspiring
demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in matters
pertaining to the sexes." Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Later in his dissent, discussing
the majority's reasoning, he lamented that it was "largely obscured by anti-male-chauvinist
oratory." Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in previous cases to supply litigants a cause of action.71 He observed
that the result in J.E.B., a retrial for a defendant who "by implication
of the Court's own reasoning" was not harmed and whose paternity
had been conclusively determined, "illustrates why making restitution
to Paul when it is Peter who has been robbed is such a bad idea."72
Finally, Justice Scalia contended that the peremptory challenge, as an
institution, is not discriminatory unless one focuses on specific
exercises of the challenge;73 in the aggregate, he argued, peremptory
challenges do not deny equal protection to any particular group.74
The Court's concern for both constitutional equal protection and
the peremptory challenge is reflected in many of its decisions
concerning jury selection75 and is clearly demonstrated in a review
of the cases leading up to J.E.B. The seminal case on the relevance
of the Fourteenth Amendment to race-based juror selection is
Strauder v. West Virginia,76 decided a short twelve years after the
71. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 618-19 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-15 (1991).
72. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scientific evidence presented at
trial established the defendant's paternity with 99.92% accuracy. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to clarify his position, saying that
"[tihe situation would be different if both sides systematically struck individuals of one
group, so that the strikes evinced group-based animus and served as a proxy for segregated
venire lists." Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,223-
24 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
74. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority sharply criticized this reasoning,
stating that Justice Scalia "fail[ed] to advance any justification for his apparent belief that
the Equal Protection Clause, while prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in the
exercise of peremptory challenges, allows discrimination on the basis of gender." Id. at
1428 n.12. An answer to this criticism may lie in the fact that although Justice Scalia noted
the precedent of Batson, Powers, Edmonson and McCollum, see infra notes 111-165, to call
attention to what he termed the "irrationality" of the majority's approach, J.E.B., 114 S.
Ct. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting), he rejected the third-party standing analysis. Therefore,
Scalia presumably would reject most claims of unconstitutional peremptory strikes unless
that claim was raised by an excluded juror. See also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,
2364-65 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice O'Connor that it is "terminally
absurd" to hold that a criminal defendant resisting prosecution is a state actor); Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 644-45 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
Justice O'Connor that private attorneys who employ peremptory challenges are not state
actors); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 426-29 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is..
. no sound basis for abandoning the normal injury-in-fact requirements applicable to third-
party standing. .. ").
75. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357-58 (1992); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1964),
overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
76. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Recognizing the deep historical roots of the Fourteenth
Amendment's application to jury selection beginning with Strauder, the Court in 1992
noted that "[o]ver the last century, in an almost unbroken chain of decisions, this Court
gradually has abolished race as a consideration for jury service." McCollum, 112 S. Ct, at
[Vol. 73
1995] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
adoption of the Amendment itself. In Strauder, a black defendant
charged with murder challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
that limited jury service to white males.78 Interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause to guarantee black citizens "exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,' '79 the Court
ruled that "the statute of West Virginia... amounts to a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon
trial for an alleged offense against the State."'  Although declining
to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment would bar jury
discrimination against groups other than blacks,"' the Court made
clear that it did not consider such an application of the Equal
Protection Clause likely.' Significantly, the Court framed its
discussion in terms of discrimination against both potential jurors 3
and the litigants themselves.' However, although discussing the
harm caused to potential jurors by the West Virginia statute, the
2352.
77. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 1868. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
78. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304-05.
79. Id at 308.
80. Id. at 310.
81. Id. The Court said that it was "not now called upon to affirm or deny that it had
other purposes." Id. However, the Court also hinted that a more expansive interpretation
was at least conceivable by asserting that even if the protection of blacks "is the spirit and
meaning of the amendment, whether it means more or not, it is to be construed liberally,
to carry out the purposes of its framers." Id. at 307. The Court reinforced this implication
by later adding that "if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen
... there [would] be [no] doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the amendment."
Id. at 308.
82. Id. at 307. The Court recalled its statements in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed only for the
protection of the "emancipated race," and reasoned that a state might still confine jury
selection "to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons
having educational qualifications." Id. at 310; ef. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that initial drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
discrimination only against blacks, but that this language was not included in the draft that
eventually was ratified).
83. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. The Court, in stark language, declared that the fact that
the West Virginia law "singled out" blacks and "expressly denied by a statute all right to
participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color . . . is
practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law." Id.
84. Id. The Court asserted that denying a litigant a jury selected "without
discrimination against [individuals of] his color," id. at 309, would be tantamount to
denying the litigant the right to a fair jury trial, because "the very idea of a jury is a body
of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine." Id. at 308.
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Court ultimately based it decision solely on the harm caused to the
litigant," perhaps to avoid issues of third-party standing.
In 1961,86 the Court in Hoyt v. Florida' recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment reached "not only arbitrary class exclusions
from jury service based on race or color, but also all other exclusions"
made without a reasonable basis.8 In Hoyt, a woman convicted by
an all-male jury of murdering her husband claimed that a Florida
statute granting all female citizens an exemption from registering for
jury service was unconstitutional.89 In effect, the statute automatical-
ly placed the names of all qualified' males onto the jury list, while
it required all women to register with the Clerk of Court; predictably,
"only a minimal number of women" registered.91 Stating that the
current case presented "narrower issues,"'  the Court refused to
scrutinize "the continuing validity of... dictum in Strauder... to the
effect that a State may constitutionally 'confine' jury duty 'to
males.' "I The Court held that the primary issue is whether the
85. Md at 310.
86. After Strauder, more than 50 years passed before the Court first addressed the
issue of gender bias in the selection of jurors in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187,189-
90 (1946). In deciding that women who qualified for jury service under state law could not
be barred from jury panels in a federal court in that state, the Ballard Court did not
address constitutional issues. Id. at 193. The Court reached its conclusion based on its
"power of supervision" over the federal courts. Id. Congress had specified that
qualifications for federal jurors were to be the same as those for jurors in the forum state,
and women were qualified as jurors under local law in California; thus, the Court stated
that to deny women the right to serve as jurors would be a "departure from the scheme
of jury selection" established by Congress. Id. at 191-93.
Although an important milestone in the development of women's right to participate
in jury trials, see generally J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424 (calling attention to the significance
of Ballard in the general advancement of gender law), Ballard created no binding
precedent for courts to use in determining the extension of Fourteenth Amendment
protections to female litigants or prospective female jurors. The Civil Rights Act of 1957,
however, gave women the statutory right to serve on federal juries. Pub. L. No. 85-315,
part V, § 152, 71 Stat. 638 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988)).
87. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
88. Il at 60 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,478 (1954)). The Court at this
time applied only the "rational relation" test to gender-based classifications. Id. at 61.
89. Id. at 58.
90. The qualifications for jury service were the standard age, citizenship, and residency
requirements. Id. at 58 n.1.
91. Id at 58.
92. Id. at 60.
93. Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880)). In eschewing
the constitutional question, the Court noted in justification that the proposition that states
could limit jury duty to males had "gone unquestioned for more than eighty years in the
decisions of the Court." Ld. (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947)). The
Court found support for its position in the fact that congressional policy had reflected the
[Vol. 73
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
purported "exemption" is "in substance an exclusionary device" 94
and determined that the "relevant inquiry" into this issue is "whether
the exemption itself is based on some reasonable classification and
whether the manner in which it is exercisable rests on some rational
foundation."'95 Applying this "rational relation" test, the Court
found that the differentiation between men and women in the statute
and its application bore a rational relation to the state's interest in
protecting "home and family life."96 The Court overruled Hoyt in
1975.' However, in doing so, it employed a Sixth Amendment
analysis rather than equal protection methodology, leaving its
underlying rationale undisturbed.
Between 1964 and 1994 the Supreme Court addressed few cases
involving gender differentiation in jury selection, but it took
significant steps in addressing racial discrimination in that context. In
1965, the Court decided Swain v. Alabama," which involved alleged
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in the trial of a black
man accused of rape.1" The defendant claimed that the state had
used its peremptory strikes to exclude all blacks from the petit
same posture until just four years earlier. Id. Ironically, even though Congress made
women eligible for jury service in the federal courts by passing the Civil Rights Act of
1957, the Court found no reason to follow Congress's lead in that instance, asserting that
there was "no indication that such congressional action was impelled by constitutional
considerations." Id. at 60 n.2 (citing Fay, 332 U.S. at 290).
94. Presumably, had the Court determined that the statute was exclusionary, it might
have been compelled to reconsider the dictum from Strauder that it so carefully avoided
examining.
95. 368 U.S. at 61.
96. Id. at 62-63. The Court said that
[d]espite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and
protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life
formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center
of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible
for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman
should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she herself
determines that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities.
Id. at 61-62. The majority in J.E.B. characterized the Hoyt ruling as an "unwilling[ness]
to translate [the Court's] appreciation for the value of women's contribution to civic life
into an enforceable right to equal treatment under state laws governing jury service."
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
97. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
98. Id. at 533-37 (requiring the jury to be drawn from a fair cross section of the
community).
99. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
100. Id. at 203.
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jury.0  He also advanced a "broader claim" that prosecutors in the
county where the trial was held had "systematically exercised their
strikes to prevent any and all Negroes... from serving on the petit
jury." The Court responded to the first claim by agreeing with
the state that the peremptory challenge system
affords a suitable and necessary method of securing juries
which in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair and
impartial. This system, it is said, in and of itseWt provides
justification for striking any group of otherwise qualified
jurors in any given case, whether they be Negroes, Catholics,
accountants or those with blue eyes. Based on the history
of this system and its actual use and operation in this
country, we think there is merit in this position. 03
The Court went on to examine at length the "history" and "actual
use" of the peremptory challenge' °4 to support its conclusion that
"[t]o subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the
demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause
would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the
challenge."' 5  The Court did not explain why the peremptory
challenge system was sacrosanct even as against Equal Protection
Clause demands in individual cases, but instead avoided the issue of
constitutional supremacy by asserting that "[t]he presumption in any
particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's
challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the
court.
' ' 1I06
101. The defendant also tried to establish that the state purposefully had discriminated
against blacks in the selection of the grand jury and the petit jury venire. Id. at 205. The
Court rejected Swain's statistical evidence, which tended to show that "only 10 to 15% of
the grand and petit jury panels drawn from the jury box" between 1953 and 1964 had been
black males, while black men comprised 26% of all men in the county of eligible age for
jury service. Id. The Court held that the defendant had not met the "quantum of proof,"
id., necessary to show purposeful discrimination, in part because "a defendant in a criminal
case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race on the
jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit jurors are drawn." Id.
at 208.
102. Id. at 222-23.
103. Id. at 212.
104. Id. at 212-21. The Court said that the "function of the challenge is not only to
eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors
before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them,
and not otherwise." Id. at 219.
105. Id. at 221-22.
106. Id. at 222. Summarizing its decision, the Court said that it had "decided that it is
permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular jury on the
assumption that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case
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However, the Swain Court, in response to the defendant's claim
of widespread discrimination in the use of peremptories, held that a
"State's systematic striking of Negroes in the selection of petit juries"
might give rise to a valid claim under the Equal Protection
Clause."°7 The proof required to establish such a prima facie claim
would be extensive, and would be required to sustain a rational
"inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly
unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the
peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right
and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice" that
the majority enjoys.' A defendant making a challenge against the
state still had to overcome the strong presumption that the prosecutor
was using the state's challenges in an impartial manner." 9  The
Court then demonstrated the narrowness of its new holding and the
strength of the presumption: Despite a showing that no blacks had
served on a petit jury in Talledega County for some fifteen years, the
Court found that the record did not show "with any acceptable degree
of clarity ... when, how often, and under what circumstances the
prosecutor alone [was] responsible for striking those Negroes who
have appeared on petit jury panels in Talledega County.""u0
Batson v. Kentucky,"' decided in 1986, invited the Supreme
Court to revisit the question posed twenty years earlier in Swain."2
In Batson, a black defendant in a criminal trial complained that the
prosecution had used peremptory challenges to remove all black
persons from the jury panel."13 The Court noted that the defendant
claimed, rather than a violation of his rights under the Equal
Protection Clause, a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of
the community."4 However, the Court observed that the defendant
had "framed his argument in these terms in an apparent effort to
avoid inviting the Court directly to reconsider one of its own
he is trying." Id. at 223. The Court did not, however, state any constitutional justification
for erecting such a formidable presumption.
107. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
108. IL
109. 1& at 222.
110. Id. at 224.
111. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
112. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
113. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
114. Id. at 84-85 n.4.
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precedents.""-'  In response, the Court itself reframed the
defendant's arguments and directly addressed the Fourteenth
Amendment precedent in Swain."6 Rejecting the "evidentiary
formulation" in Swain as irreconcilable with current standards for
making out a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause," 7
the Court overruled the portion of Swain that required a showing of
systematic use of peremptories by the state to prove a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'
Echoing language from Strauder v. West Virginia,"9 the Court
then declared that, despite the fact that a defendant does not have a
right to a jury made up " 'in whole or in part of persons of his own
race,' "120 a "defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury
whose members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory crite-
ria.' ' 2 1  The Court stated that this right to nondiscriminatory jury
selection extended to the exercise of individual peremptory challeng-
es' and held that a criminal defendant "may establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely
on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial."" As Chief Justice Burger
115. Ia
116. With patent irony, the Court credited the State with correctly contending that
"resolution of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection
principles," and that the Court "must reconsider Swain to find a constitutional violation
on this record." Id. at 85 n.4.
117. Id. at 91-93.
118. Id. at 90-96; see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-24 (1965), overruled by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Court held that because lower courts had
interpreted Swain to require "proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases
... to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause," Batson, 476 U.S. at 92, a
"crippling burden of proof' now rested on defendants, with the undesirable result that
"prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."
Id. at 92-93.
119. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
120. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305
(1880)).
121. Id. at 85-86 (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906); Exparte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
122. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96. The Court based this extension on post-Swain decisions
prohibiting racial discrimination in the selection of jury venires in individual cases, and
observed that" '[a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not 'immunized
by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.' " Id.
at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266 n.14
(1977)).
123. Id. at 96. The Court acknowledged the fact that most of its previous decisions
concerning jury selection dealt with discrimination in "the selection of the venire," but
found that "the principles announced there also forbid discrimination on account of race
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noted in his dissent, however, the majority did not apply the
"conventional equal protection framework" to the exercise of the
peremptory challenge, and the ruling reflected only general equal
protection principles.124
The Batson Court went on to establish a three-part test for
determining whether a defendant has established a valid prima facie
case:
[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a
cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exer-
cised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is
entitled to rely on the fact ... that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Finally, the
defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race."z
The Court constructed this test by drawing on similar tests for prima
facie discrimination developed in previous decisions. 26  Once a
defendant makes the above showing, the burden shifts to the State to
proffer "a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors."127 The
Court added, however, that this explanation need not "rise to the
level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause."1 The Court "ex-
press[ed] no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on
the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel"; 29 nor
did it address whether limits could be imposed on gender discrimina-
tion"' in civil trials.
in selection of the petit jury." I&. at 88. The Court declared that defendants were
guaranteed equal protection throughout a trial, and that "the State may not draw up its
jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at 'other stages
in the selection process.' " I- at 88 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953)).
124. The Chief Justice summarized the "three-tier" structure of equal protection
analysis and then observed that the majority may have been trying to "avoid acknowledg-
ing that the state interest involved [in the peremptory challenge] has historically been
regarded by this Court as substantial, if iiot compelling." Id. at 125 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 96 (citations omitted) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953)).
126. Id. at 94.
127. Id. at 97.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 89 n.12.
130. However, Chief Justice Burger predicted that "if conventional equal protection
principles apply, then presumably defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not
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The Supreme Court answered, in three subsequent rulings, some
of the questions left open by its decision in Batson. Of these post-
Batson juror discrimination cases, Powers v. Ohio' is arguably the
most significant. In Powers, the Court addressed the question of
whether a defendant had standing to challenge the constitutionality
of race-based peremptory strikes exercised against venire members of
another race.132 Acknowledging that Batson stood for the proposi-
tion that a defendant could bring an equal protection claim by
"showing that the prosecutor used [peremptory strikes] for the
purpose of excluding members of the defendant's race, 133 the Court
rejected the State's claim in Powers that "the race of the objecting
defendant constitutes a relevant precondition for a Batson chal-
lenge. ''1 4  Building upon a recognition that discrimination against
a potential juror is in itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 35 the Court sought to empower a litigant to challenge that
discrimination. However, traditional precepts of third-party standing,
which provide only "limited exceptions" to the rule that "a litigant...
cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties,, 136 threatened to make such empowerment impossible. The
Court noted that its decisions required three criteria to be satisfied
before according a party third-party standing: a tangible injury to the
litigant, a "close relation to the third party," and the existence of
some obstacle to the third party's capability of protecting himself.'37
The Court solved this problem by liberalizing the traditional rules
of third-party standing. 38  First, the Court found an injury to the
only race, but also sex." Id. at 124 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976)).
131. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
132. Id. at 402. In Powers, a white criminal defendant claimed that the State had
discriminated against potential jurors by using seven peremptory strikes to eliminate black
members of the petit jury venire. Id. at 401-03.
133. Id. at 405.
134. Id. at 406. The Court said that Batson was designed to serve a number of
purposes, "only one of which was to protect individual defendants from discrimination in
the selection of jurors." Id. (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255,259 (1986) (per curiam)).
However, by effectively removing the only significant requirement that the party bringing
the claim would have to meet-the requirement that defendant and the excluded jurors
be of the same race-Powers essentially made it unnecessary for a litigant to claim
discrimination against himself.
135. Id. at 406-08; see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
136. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (citing Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715,720
(1990)).




defendant in the fact that "racial discrimination in the selection of
jurors 'casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process,' and places
the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt."' 9  Second, the
Court said that both the defendant and excluded venireperson "have
a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the
courtroom" and that both may otherwise "lose confidence in the court
and its verdicts."" This "congruence of interests, '" 4 ' the Court
observed, makes the litigant an appropriate advocate of the excluded
juror's rights. 4  Finally, the Court identified a number of
impediments to the assertion by excluded jurors of their own rights,
not the least of which were "practical barriers ... because of the
small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of
litigation."'43 Examined separately, each of the three rationales the
Court advanced to satisfy third-party standing rules was only a modest
expansion of frequently accepted propositions; together, however,
they represent a significant departure from traditional analysis. By
recognizing a defendant standing in this type of case, the Court
cleared a major obstacle from the path extending the availability of
Batson claims to a wide range of litigants.
Another question the Court left unanswered in Batson was
whether the prohibition against the exercise of race-based
peremptories was limited only to criminal cases. On its face, the
Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discriminatory actions by a
state, 44 and the Court traditionally has carefully protected the right
of private litigants to "structure their personal relations as they choose
subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law."' 45
139. Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)). But see id. at 426-29
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that under traditional third-party standing, an injury must
be palpable or concrete).
140. i& at 413-14.
141. Id. at 414.
142. Id. The Court also justified its conclusion by reference to similar cases: "Here,
the relation between petitioner and the excluded jurors is as close as, if not closer than,
those we have recognized to convey third-party standing in our prior cases." IM at 413
(citing Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
143. Id. at 415. The Court also noted the fact that "jurors are not parties to the jury
selection process" and that the difficulty individual jurors face in proving that discrimina-
tion would likely recur as obstacles to the assertion of their own rights. Id. at 414-15.
144. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see also supra note 8.
145. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991); see also National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (discussing constitutional
dichotomy between state action and private conduct); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948) (opining that adherence to state action requirement preserves individual freedom).
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However, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,46 decided in 1991,
the Court addressed this issue and in the context of peremptory
strikes reached a different conclusion. Prefacing its discussion of
state-actor status, the majority said that courts must occasionally
determine "where the government sphere ends and the private sphere
begins."'4 The Court noted that private individuals' relations were
almost always beyond the scope of the Constitution, but that
"governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent
that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the
government and ... subject to constitutional constraints."'148 The
Court enumerated two questions designed to determine if the action
of a private citizen had crossed into the governmental sphere: first,
whether the allegedly unconstitutional action was grounded in state
authority, and second, "whether the private party charged with the
deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor. 149
The Court found that the statutory source of the peremptory strikes
in question in Edmonson was clear, and thus that the first part of the
state action test had been met. 50 Turning to the second question,
the Court discussed at length the nature of the peremptory challenge
and its role in trial procedure. 5' Citing the "extensive use of state
procedures"'" and the aid afforded to litigants by state officials, the
fact that the peremptory is a "traditional function" of government, 53
and the fact that the harm caused by the discrimination is magnified
by the government's acquiescence," the Court found the use of
peremptory challenges to be a proxy for state action by private
litigants.'55
In Georgia v. McCollum, 6 decided one year after Edmonson,
the Court addressed whether a state could contest a criminal
146. 500 U.S. 614.
147. Id. at 620.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 621-28.
152. Id. at 622.
153. Id. at 624.
154. Id. at 628.
155. Id. at 627. Justice O'Connor roundly criticized the majority in her dissent, and was
joined in that dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. She contended that
"[n]ot everything that happens in a courtroom is state action. A trial, particularly a civil
trial is by design largely a stage on which private parties may act .... The government
erects the platform; it does not thereby become responsible for all that occurs upon it."
Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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defendant's use of peremptory challenges. In McCollum, the State
of Georgia, prior to jury selection, sought to bar the white defendants
from using peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors.'58 The Court
identified four criteria for determining whether a criminal defendant's
use of peremptories was governed by constitutional concerns, two of
which were almost foregone conclusions in light of Powers and
Edmonson. 59  As to the two remaining questions, the Court first
addressed "whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a
criminal defendant constitutes state action."'1'  The defendants
argued that "the adversarial relationship between the defendant and
the prosecution negates the governmental character of the peremptory
challenge";' 6' however, the Court found that the extent of the
appropriation of governmental power necessarily involved in the
exercise of peremptories, as described in Edmonson, outweighed such
concerns. 62 The other difficult question for the Court was "whether
the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant nonetheless preclude
the extension of our precedents to this case."' 3 The Court held
that because the peremptory challenge was not granted by the
Constitution, a prohibition of its use in a discriminatory fashion was
not an infringement of the defendant's constitutional rights."6 The
157. Id. at 2353.
158. Id. at 2351. The State made this claim prior to jury selection because opposing
counsel had indicated a clear intent to use peremptories in a discriminatory fashion. Id.
Furthermore, the State claimed that because Georgia law gave each party 20 peremptory
strikes in this type of felony case, the defendants likely would be able to strike all African-
American venirepersons. Id. at 2351 & n.2.
159. Id. at 2353. The two easily answered questions were "whether a criminal
defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner inflicts
the harms addressed by Batson" and "whether prosecutors have standing to raise this
constitutional challenge." Id. The Court answered the former with reference to Strauder
and Batson, focusing primarily on the perpetration of harm to the community by
discrimination in jury selection, i. at 2353-54; it answered the latter simply by applying the
Powers third-party standing analysis, id. at 2357 ("[A] litigant may raise a claim on behalf
of a third party if the litigant can demonstrate that he has suffered a concrete injury, that
he has a close relation to the third party, and that there exists some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect its own interests.").
160. Id. at 2353.
161. Id. at 2356. The defendants relied on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981),
in which the Supreme Court ruled that "a public defender does not qualify as a state actor
when engaged in his general representation of a criminal defendant." Id. (citing Polk
County, 454 U.S. at 325). The Court in MeCollum rejected the defendants' argument,
stating that the determination of state actor status for a public defender depended on the
character of the function he was performing. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2353.
164. Id. at 2358.
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Court ruled, therefore, that a criminal defendant could be considered
a state actor in the narrow context of the peremptory challenge
system. 165
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court analyzed all equal protection
claims by applying a "rational relation" test to any challenged
government action or statute, unless the government classification in
question differentiated among individuals on the basis of race. 66
Under this standard, a court faced with "a challenge to a legislative
classification... should ask, first, what the purposes of the statute are
and, second, whether the classification is rationally related to
achievement of those purposes."'167 Most statutes pass this test for
constitutionality unless they are patently arbitrary; correlatively,
government actions are accorded a strong presumption of constitu-
tionality."6  However, if the classification differentiates on the
grounds of race, courts apply a more rigorous examination to the
statute or government action. This upper tier of equal protection
analysis is commonly referred to as "strict scrutiny.''169  Under this
standard, a statutory distinction violates the Equal Protection Clause
165. Id. at 2356. Justice O'Connor, calling the holding "perverse," expressed
amazement at the majority's "conclusion that criminal defendants being prosecuted by the
State act on behalf of their adversary when they exercise peremptory challenges during
jury selection." Id. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, agreeing with Justice
O'Connor's demonstration of the "sheer inanity" of the ruling, added that McCollum
represented the reduction of the logic employed in Edmonson "to the terminally absurd."
Id. at 2364 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) ("One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does
not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.").
167. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,184 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,2642-43 (1993) ("[A] classification 'must
be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification' "); Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) ("[T]he pertinent inquiry is whether the classification employed
... advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion."); United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down as "clearly irrelevant" to the
legislative purpose of the program a classification that determined eligibility to participate
in the federal food stamp program based on whether or not the household was composed
solely of related persons); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920) (stating
that classification schemes in state legislation must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike").
168. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971).
169. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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if it does not further a compelling governmental interest in the most
narrowly-tailored manner possible.171 That is, if the governmental
interest is not compelling, or if another method of achieving the
governmental interest exists that does not discriminate on the basis of
race, the statute will be ruled unconstitutional.
Beginning with Reed v. Reed" in 1971, the Supreme Court
began to carve out a new category of equal protection analysis to
address discrimination based on gender. In Reed, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of an Idaho probate code provision
that gave preference to males over females in the selection of estate
administrators. The Court first noted that the Equal Protection
Clause forbids a state from "legislat[ing] that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the
basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute."' 74
Although the Court professed to be employing the rational-relation
test,175 its actions belied this assertion. Ruling that the statute,
although designed to advance an ostensibly rational state
objective, 76 was not consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court for the first time struck down a gender classification under
the aegis of the Equal Protection Clause'" and "implicitly rejected"
application of the rational-relation standard to gender. 71 Although
it took several subsequent decisions for the Court to clarify this new,
heightened standard of review and to advance specific criteria for its
application, the Court's ruling in Reed essentially began the
170. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
171. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
172. Id. at 76.
173. Id. at 73. The code section provided that when more than one person of the same
entitlement class sought to administer a decedent's estate, males would be preferred over
females. Id. In Reed, both the adoptive mother and adoptive father of a minor decedent
sought to be appointed administrator of their son's estate; by virtue of the statute, the
probate court appointed the father. Id. at 72.
174. Id. at 75-76. The Court added that under the traditional analysis "[a] classification
'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
175. Id.
176. The Court noted that the objective of the statute, as declared by the Idaho
Supreme Court, was to further a legitimate state interest in reducing the administrative
workloads of Idaho probate courts by eliminating one area of conflict certain to arise
under the probate code. Id
177. STONE ET AL., supra note 45, at 678.
178. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1972).
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development of a requirement of heightened scrutiny for reviewing
gender classifications. 79
In Frontiero v. Richardson,"8 the Supreme Court explicitly
confirmed its implication in Reed that gender classifications warrant
a higher level of judicial scrutiny than other classifications, and in fact
a plurality of the Court believed that gender, like race, should be
considered an "inherently suspect" category.1 8' If that rationale had
been adopted in a majority opinion, classifications based on gender
presumably would now require the same "strict scrutiny" as those
based on race. Writing for four Justices," Justice Brennan
presented a litany of reasons why gender should be recognized as a
suspect class.'3 After laying the foundation with an interpretation
of the holding in Reed," he recounted the long history of gender
discrimination in the United States, concluding that prejudice toward
women was still substantial."8 Given the immutability and "high
visibility of the sex characteristic,"'" Justice Brennan wrote that
"what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria,
is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society."'" Finally, Justice Brennan
bolstered his argument for establishing gender as a suspect class by
noting that Congress, "a coequal branch of Government,"'"
apparently had "concluded that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious." '89
179. In addition to gender, the Court now apparently also recognizes illegitimacy as a
"heightened scrutiny" classification. STONE ET AL., supra note 45, at 732-41.
180. 411 U.S. 677 (1972).
181. Id. at 688. Although borrowing the analytical posture that the Court had
established for Fourteenth Amendment challenges, Justice Brennan actually reached this
decision under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 690-691.
182. Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall joined Justice Brennan in the plurality
decision. Id. at 678. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell
concurred in the judgment. Justice Rehnquist voiced the lone dissent. Id. at 691.
183. Id. at 682-88.
184. Id. at 682-83.
185. Id. at 684-86.
186. Id. at 686.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 687-88.
189. Justice Brennan based this conclusion on language in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1988), the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1988),
and the Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523




Applying "strict scrutiny" to the statute in Frontiero,'" Justice
Brennan concluded that the government's stated purpose in drafting
the statute-administrative convenience-was not compelling. 9'
"[W]hen we enter the realm of 'strict judicial scrutiny,' " he wrote,
"there can be no doubt that 'administrative convenience' is not a
shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality."'
Therefore, the challenged classification could not survive."9 Justice
Powell, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to explain that
he could not "join the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, which would
hold that all classifications based upon sex.., are 'inherently suspect
and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.' ""4
Although Justice Powell refrained from voicing direct opposition to
such an expansion of equal protection methodology, he noted that the
Court did not need to reach that issue in Frontiero, and should
"reserve for the future any expansion of [the Reed] rationale."'95
In Craig v. Boren ' and Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, "9 the Court refined an intermediate level of review for
gender classifications. In Craig, the Court ruled on the constitutional-
ity of an Oklahoma statute that made it illegal to sell reduced-alcohol
beer to males under twenty-one years of age, but only prohibited the
sale of such beer to females if they were under the age of eigh-
teen.19 Noting Reed's authority, the Court stated that "[t]o
withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
190. In Frontiero, a female Air Force officer sought to claim her husband as a
dependent to obtain increased benefits under federal statute. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678;
see 37 U.S.C. §§ 401 (1988, Supp. 1m 1991, & Supp. V 1993), 403 (1988 & Supp. m1 1991);
10 U.S.C. §§ 1072 (1988, Supp. 1 1989, Supp. IV 1992, & Supp. V 1993), 1076 (1988, Supp.
1 1989, & Supp. II 1990). The statutes automatically accorded dependent status to wives
of servicemen, but required a servicewoman to show that her husband was "in fact
dependent upon her for over one-half of his support." Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678-79; see
37 U.S.C. § 401; 10 U.S.C. § 1072.
191. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683, 688-91.
192. Id. at 690.
193. Id. at 691.
194. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 682 (plurality opinion)).
195. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell believed that
the Court should withhold the expansion of Reed until the ratification, or the failure of the
states to ratify, the Equal Rights Amendment. Id.
196. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
197. 458 U.S. 718 (1981).
198. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92. The action was brought by "Craig, a male then between
18 and 21 years of age, and by... Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer." Id at 192.
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objectives.""' Although the Court cited no authority for the
wording of these criteria,2°° it went on to apply them to the case at
hand, and ruled that the statute was unconstitutional."' In dissent,
Justice Rehnquist contended that the Court's standard "apparently
comes out of thin air."' '
The Court applied the new standard again in Hogan, in which a
male nurse sought admission to a state university's nursing school to
obtain his baccalaureate degree, but was refused solely because of his
gender.20 3  Applying the "heightened scrutiny" standard, 4 the
Court found that the State had "fallen far short of establishing the
'exceedingly persuasive justification' needed to sustain the gender-
based classifications."'  The majority summarized the test for
gender discrimination developed in Reed, Craig, and related cases. 21
First, a disputed statute must differentiate between citizens on the
basis of gender.' n Once a party has established this fact, the
burden shifts to the party seeking to enforce the statutory classifica-
tion to show "an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
classification."2  This justification must demonstrate that the
differentiation "serves 'important governmental objectives' and ...
[is]'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' )7209
Finally, the Court stated that the test for a gender classification must
199. Id. at 197.
200. The use of the term "important" to describe the governmental interests at issue
finds no precedent in earlier cases, falling as it does between the "legitimate" interests
required by the "rational-relation" test and the "compelling" interests required by strict
scrutiny. The requirement of "substantial relation" apparently is drawn from an earlier
formulation of the rational-relation test, which is noted in Reed. 404 U.S. at 76; see also
infra note 174.
201. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201.
202. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also pointed out the
apparent inconsistency of applying heightened judicial scrutiny to a statute that
purportedly discriminates against males, when much of the Court's support for applying
more than a "rational relation" test rested on the long history of discrimination against
women in the United States. Id. at 217-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720-21 (1981).
204. Id. at 727-31.
205. Id. at 731 (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
206. Id. at 723; see Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256,273 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
279 (1979).
207. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)).
208. Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 461; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273).




be applied "free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females. 2
1 0
Batson and its offspring set the stage for the decision in
J.E.B., extending the long arm of the Equal Protection Clause to race-
based peremptory strikes. The cases derived from Reed enabled the
JE.B. Court logically to expand the reach of equal protection to
gender-based peremptory strikes. However, the fusion of the two
lines of precedent is not a perfect one. Most importantly, although
Reed and the decisions that followed it were based squarely on the
developing three-tiered equal protection methodology,"' Batson,21 3
Powers,214  Edmonson,1  and McCollum216  were based on
previous jury venire cases' a more general equal protection
rationale.218 On the particular facts of Batson, in which a black
defendant contested the use of peremptories to eliminate
venirepersons of his own race, the Court could have fashioned a
suspect class analysis2 9 under which race-based peremptories would
have to pass the test of strict scrutiny.2  Instead, the Court
employed a general equal protection analysis to determine that no
210. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-725. Justice Powell, dissenting, advanced the same
objection that Justice Rehnquist raised in Craig, see supra note 202, concerning the
application of intermediate scrutiny to state actions against males. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 740-
42 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority justified its approach with reference to Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,394 (1979), and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,279 (1979), two cases
establishing that the fact that a "statutory policy discriminates against males rather than
against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review."
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723.
211. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
212. See supra note 10.
213. See supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
217. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1986)
218. Id. at 88-96; see also id. at 123 (Burger, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's
support for the decision in Batson).
219. If the Court had chosen to approach the problem using the tier model, it
presumably could have found the requisite harm to the litigant by applying a Strauder-
derived test.
220. On the facts of Powers, McCollum, and Edmonson, however, the Court would
have found such a framework untenable; there would have been no direct harm to the
litigant to trigger a higher level of scrutiny. In those cases, the issue of third-party
standing was the crucial nexus that allowed the litigant to state a claim; without a
cognizable harm to the juror, the litigant presumably would have been unable to contest
the discriminatory use of peremptories. The Court seemed at the time to be moving away
from requiring any direct harm to the litigant, as it seemed willing to do in Batson, and
towards hanging its judicial hat on the new twist it had recently put on third-party standing
in Powers. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
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race-based peremptory strikes ever will be tolerable in the
courtroom.22' As a result, the "Batson test" for race-based
peremptories is simply an identification test; if a litigant's use of
peremptory strikes meets the criteria of the test, the strikes will be
summarily disallowed unless the litigant can offer race-neutral
justifications for them.
Instead of finally bringing the Reed and Batson approaches into
harmony, the J.E.B. Court actually seemed to engage in a judicial
sleight of hand: By spending a great deal of time tracing the history
of gender bias in this country and comparing it to racial discrimina-
tion, the Court directed attention away from the incomplete welding
of the two lines of cases.' Despite the Court's effort, fissures in
the framework are still visible. Unlike the Batson Court, the J.E.B.
Court first recognized the tier model of equal protection and exam-
ined gender-based peremptories using the heightened scrutiny criteria
from Reed.'
At this point, having found discrimination against excluded jurors,
the Court might have applied the Powers third-party standing analysis
and concluded that the litigant had standing to address the harm done
to those jurors as members of the protected class. Instead, the Court
invoked general equal protection principles, emphasizing the
triumvirate of harms articulated in Strauder and Batson: damages
inflicted on the litigant, on excluded jurors and on the community. 4
The Court finally rested its decision on the harm done to excluded
jurors, ' and did seem to find that harm in the discrimination
identified by the suspect class analysis, but by employing both
analyses the Court may have created confusion for the lower
courts. 6 In fact, the Court seemed unwilling to forego nay of the
221. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
222. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1225.
223. Id. at 1424-26.
224. Id. at 1427.
225. Id at 1430.
226. Though the Court did not say so explicitly, it may have applied the Powers third-
party standing rule to furnish the petitioner with a right to raise the equal protection claim
on behalf of the excluded jurors. See id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, J.E.B.is
more closely analogous to Batson than it is to Powers, in that the excluded jurors in J.E.B.
were members of the same "group" as the petitioner, and thus under the general equal




potential justifications'm  for prohibiting the discriminatory
peremptory challenge.
The separate criteria used in the Batson and Reed lines of cases
and the decision in J.E.B. together suggest a new standard for
analyzing alleged gender bias in the use of peremptory challenges.
Under this hypothetical analysis, a party seeking to show gender bias
first must make out a prima facie case of discriminatory intent in the
use of peremptories under the three-part Batson test, 9 as modified
by Powers, Edmonson, and McCollum." If a prima facie case
were made, the burden then would shift to the party defending his use
of peremptories to justify that use.2" Given the difference between
the intermediate scrutiny accorded to gender classifications and the
strict scrutiny accorded to race classifications, this justification should
not need to be unequivocally gender-neutral 32  To rebut the
presumption of an invalid use of peremptory strikes, the party
227. Those justifications presumably include: a general equal protection or suspect class
analysis in cases in which the litigant and excluded jurors are members of the same class;
a general equal protection of suspect class analysis, using liberalized third-party standing
rules to give litigants a cause of action; and perhaps a fundamental rights justification, see
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (suggesting that the basis for disallowing discrimination against
individual jurors is the abridgement of the right to participate in the justice system).
228. The Court's efforts to "bundle" together several justifications for the decision in
J.E.B. may have been the impetus for Justice Kennedy's separate opinion, which outlined
his understanding of recent precedent and its implications for J.E.B. Id. at 1433-34
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy had written for the majority in
Powers, 499 U.S. 400,400 (1991), and Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614,614 (1991); those decisions
clearly reflected a desire for one overriding rationale in the examination of peremptories,
and seemed to find such a rationale in the grant of third-party standing to litigants.
Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-16; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19.
229. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
230. Technically, the first criterion of the Batson test may be no longer valid, though
the Court has not specifically overturned it. Now that any litigant is afforded the right of
third-party standing by Powers, see supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text, there
should be no need for a party to "show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group,
and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (citation omitted). However,
courts continue to apply the first prong, but require only proof that a party has used
peremptory challenges to remove individuals "on the basis of race." Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991).
231. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; see supra note 127-28 and accompanying text.
232. Batson required that the justification be neutral, 476 U.S. at 97, but the Court in
J.E.B. implied that some acceptable exercises of a peremptory might possess gender-
oriented nuances. The Court said that "strikes based on characteristics that are
disproportionately associated with one gender could be appropriate, absent a showing of
pretext." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. As a practical matter, however, litigants would be
well-advised to proffer a gender-neutral justification rather than attempt to justify a strike
based on gender-related rationale.
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defending that use would have to show an "exceedingly persuasive
justification"'1 3 for the gender classifications-that is, a showing that
the differentiation between genders was substantially related to the
realization of the sole government objective of a fair and impartial
jury.24
Unfortunately, the Court's own summary of its holding leaves no
more room for conventional, intermediate scrutiny of gender-based
peremptories than Batson did for strict scrutiny in the context of race-
based strikes. 5 The Court clearly stated that all peremptory strikes
based on gender are prohibited. 6 However, its foundation for this
sweeping prohibition is not at all clear. Part of the confusion
certainly lies in the incomplete syllogism between the Court's decision
concerning the State's action in this case and the application of that
decision to all peremptories. The Court first presented the question
of whether gender-based peremptories are substantially related to an
important government interest in the abstract. 7 Then, however, it
addressed .the State of Alabama's justification 8 for the use of its
peremptories, declared that the proffered justification was invalid, and
concluded that the only valid government interest at issue was a
state's interest in securing a fair and impartial jury. 9
At this stage, the Court abandoned its intermediate-scrutiny
inquiry. Had it stated simply and explicitly that a state's interest in
securing a fair and impartial jury is never substantially furthered by
the use of gender-based peremptories, the syllogism would have been
complete. Such a result would have ensured that the holding in JE.B.
described a test similar to the one created by the Batson Court24°--a
test that simply identifies gender discrimination in peremptory strikes
and instructs trial courts to disallow those peremptories when
identified because the "substantial relation" question already has been
resolved. Instead, the Court in J.E.B. abandoned its analysis in mid-
stride and returned to a general equal rights analysis.241 The Court
could have avoided the muddy result in J.E.B. and established a test
233. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
234. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426.
235. IaM at 1430.
236. Id at 1429-30.
237. Id. at 1426.
238. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
239. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426 n.8.
240. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
241. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
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that worked just like the Batson test by focusing solely on a suspect
class analysis.242
At every stage in the Court's odyssey towards making the
peremptory challenge system fully consonant with the Equal
Protection Clause, commentators have mourned the impending loss
of the peremptory as a viable tool in the trial process.243 To be
sure, the Court's recent decisions have burdened the once unfettered
challenge with a number of caveats.2" Nevertheless, no matter how
restrictive the Court's rulings have been, the crucial question for
litigators is probably not how much more of the peremptory system
the Court will eliminate, but how to maximize the value of
peremptories within the confines of the present system. To do so,
though, one must recognize some of the procedural "costs" 245 that
242. Fortunately, trial courts seem to be responding to J.E.B. by treating the inquiry
into gender-based peremptories in the same manner they have treated Batson inquiries.
Some courts are demanding that litigants whose strikes are being challenged under J.E.B.
come forward with gender-neutral justifications. E.g., Commonwealth v. Fruchtman, 633
N.E.2d 369, 371 (Mass. 1994); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 713, 714 (Va.
1994).
243. A brief survey of the titles of journal articles published following the decisions in
Powers, Edmonson and McCollum is instructive. E.g., Robert T. Prior, The Peremptory
Challenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 MERCER L. RFv. 579 (1993); David M. Tyler, The Cleansing
of the Peremptory Challenge or an Invitation to the Grim Reaper, 71 MICH. B.J. 674 (1992);
William C. Walter, Recent Development, The Beginning of the End of Peremptory
Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 287 (1993); Karen M.
Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40
UCLA L. REV. 517 (1992); Michael A. Cressler, Comment, Powers v. Ohio: The Death
Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28 IDAHo L. REv. 349 (1991-1992); Rodger L.
Hochman, Note, Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge: The Verdict of Emerging Caselaw,
17 NOVA L. REv. 1367 (1993); J. Christopher Peters, Note, Georgia v. McCollum: It's
Strike Three for Peremptory Challenges, But is it the Bottom of the Ninth?, 53 LA. L. REv.
1723 (1993).
244. The Supreme Court Justices themselves have also been quick to recognize the
damage that their decisions cause to the peremptory system. Originating in the majority
opinion in Swain v. Alabama, see supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text, but relegated
to the dissent in Batson, is a strong conviction that the peremptory system should remain
inviolate, and that each ruling making peremptory strikes more vulnerable to attack does
irreparable harm to that system. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359-60
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (1986)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting). The Court in J.E.B. anticipated such criticism in its opinion and
contended that its decision would not eliminate the use of peremptory challenges
altogether. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429. To buttress this conclusion, the Court pointed to
the fact that many federal courts already had prohibited strikes based on gender. Id.
While the Court listed jurisdictions that had barred gender-based strikes, id. at 1422 n.1,
and suggested that these prohibitions corresponded with the continuing vitality of
peremptories, it did not present hard evidence of the effect such restrictions might have
had on the actual frequency of use in those courts. Id at 1429.
245. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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go hand-in-hand with the decision in J.E.B., and also keep a weather
eye open for rulings that might affect the peremptory practice.
The first probable consequence of the ruling in J.E.B. is a further
blurring of the line between peremptory challenges and challenges for
cause. The Court in Batson maintained that a party seeking to justify
a disputed peremptory strike was not required to present an
explanation rising to the same level as would be required of a
challenge for cause.' However, as Chief Justice Burger noted in
his dissent, the majority cleared the way for litigants to assail the
validity of peremptory strikes without advancing a new, clear standard
for delineating between such strikes and strikes made for cause.247
He believed that it was "readily apparent, then, that to permit inquiry
into the basis for a peremptory challenge would force 'the peremptory
challenge [to] collapse into the challenge for cause.' 248 Justice
O'Connor echoed this statement in J.E.B., when she stated that "as
we add, layer by layer, additional constitutional restraints on the use
of the peremptory, we force lawyers to articulate what we know is
often inarticulable. In so doing we make the peremptory challenge
less discretionary and more like a challenge for cause. 249
The second major consequence of J.E.B. is judicial delay. Justice
Scalia voiced concern over the potential for such delay in his dissent
in Edmonson,'0 contending that the decision added another
complication "to an increasingly Byzantine system of justice that
devotes more and more of its energy to sideshows and less and less
to the merits of the case.""1  Justice O'Connor, suggesting in her
concurrence in JE.B. that erosion of the peremptory challenge
institution had already occurred, noted that "Batson mini-hearings are
now routine in state and federal trial courts, and Batson appeals have
proliferated as well. Demographics indicate that today's holding may
have an even greater impact than did Batson itself." 2  Although
246. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (stating that the challenge
need only be based on a characteristic other than gender).
247. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127-28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
248. Id (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
249. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
251. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Id at 4225 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Apparently, Justice O'Connor was
concerned that with roughly equal numbers of men or women on any venire, it was highly




the Court in J.E.B. never addressed the number of venire members
of one sex that would have to be excluded in order to satisfy the third
prong of the Batson test, that question certainly will become an
important and potentially time-consuming one.zs3 The J.E.B. Court
has armed attorneys with yet another motion to file, another issue to
hold for appeal; the Court has also given a valuable tool to any
attorney who desires to slow the pretrial process.
Another, more systemic consequence of the ruling in J.E.B. may
be the multiplication of pretextual rationales offered by attorneys for
the exercise of peremptories. By forcing attorneys to "articulate
what we know is often inarticulable,"'  Batson and J.E.B. place
attorneys in the uncomfortable position of either admitting that race
or gender may have played a part in their decision to strike a member
of the venire or stating a pretextual gender or race-neutral explana-
tion."5  The Court in JE.B. suggested that the answer to this
dilemma lay in properly managed voir dire, which "can inform
litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical
and pejorative notions ... both unnecessary and unwise."" The
Court seemed to believe that any dilemma of this nature arose for the
very same reason that drove its ruling on J.E.B.: the existence of
prejudice in the hearts of attorneys and litigants 8
The Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. puts the Court in a
familiar position with respect to the peremptory challenge system. As
soon as the Batson Court lifted away the first shovelful of dirt from
the peremptory's foundation, it became clear that the extent of that
253. For example, if a state has ten peremptory strikes at its disposal, at what point
does it cross the line from "neutral" to "discriminatory," assuming no other overt actions
that indicate prejudice? After exercising eight of the peremptory strikes against women?
After using four in a row to strike men? After striking three black men, when there are
black women and white men on the venire that were not struck peremptorily?
254. Justice Marshall first voiced concern about the potential for pretextual
justifications in his concurrence in Batson. 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). See generally Douglas B. Dykes, Articulation of Non-Race Based Reasons for
Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 245 (1993)
(canvassing prosecutors' explanations for peremptory challenges in the wake of Batson).
255. J.E.B., 114 S. CL at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
256. See Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical
Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM L. RV. 685, 693-
710 (1993) (discussing the problem of pretextuality).
257. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
258. Id. at 1430 (discussing the specific problem of gender as a proxy for race
discrimination); cf. Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-
Reinforcemen Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. Rv. 1807, 1813 (1993) ("[T]he
Batson line of cases acts as a lightning rod for all of the Court's unexpressed concerns
about racism in the criminal justice system").
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holding would need to be interpreted in subsequent rulings. 9
Similarly, J.E.B. now requires clarification, especially in two areas.
First, how far will the Court go towards extending equal protection
restrictions to the other heightened and strict scrutiny classifications
of alienage, nationality, and illegitimacy?26  Second, will the
Supreme Court accept the same third-party standing analysis
advanced in Powers,261 or the state action rationales allowed in
Edmonson and McCollum262 by a litigant pursuing a claim of gender
bias in the exercise of peremptories? As to the latter question, the
answer is almost certainly "yes." The inexorable march of Batson
extensions provides a clear lesson that the Court believes that
discrimination cannot be weeded out of the courtroom until each
party's acts are governed by the precepts of the Fourteenth Aniend-
ment.263 However, since the lower courts will rule on these exten-
sions first, and the liberal nature of the Court's recent extensions of
Batson is relatively apparent, the Court probably will not hear such
cases unless a serious conflict of authority develops.
As to the first question, concerning other Fourteenth Amend-
ment protected classes, the Court has provided few hints as to future
259. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
260. Stone, supra note 45, at 718-757 (discussing the statuses of various classes). The
Court recently denied certiorari for a case involving religion-based peremptory strikes. See
Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994) (mem.), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn.
1993). In Davis, a prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike a black man from the
jury venire in a robbery trial. Id at 2120-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting). When the defendant
objected and asked for a race-neutral justification, the prosecutor explained that she had
removed the juror based on the fact that he was a Jehovah's Witness. Id. at 2121
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority did not give a reason for not reviewing the case,
but Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas in a dissent stating that "given the Court's
rationale in J.E.B., no principled reason immediately appears for declining to apply Batson
to any strike based on a classification that is accorded heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause[,... a category which presumably would include classifications based
on religion." Id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
261. That is, will the Court accept the argument that a litigant may pursue the claim
of an excluded juror, even if that juror is of the opposite sex? See supra notes 131-43 and
accompanying text.
262. That is, will civil litigants be recognized as state actors in their use of gender-based
peremptory strikes? See supra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
263. Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that the Court in Batson explicitly
identified questions that the decision left open, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12, while the J.E.B Court
did not. Furthermore, lower courts have already begun the process of extending J.E.B.
See, e.g., Martins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 645 A.2d 557 (Conn. App.)
(extending JE.B. restrictions on gender-based strikes to civil trials in which the
government is not a party), cert. denied, 648 A.2d 154 (Conn. 1994).
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extensions of Batson. However, with the extension of Batson to
gender, a classification subject only to intermediate scrutiny, the
further extension of Batson to the other two "inherently suspect"
classes, nationality and alienage, perhaps need not occur at the
Supreme Court level. Certainly litigants will find it difficult to make
a coherent argument that, in the particular context of the peremptory
challenge, classes traditionally subject to higher scrutiny actually
warrant less scrutiny than gender. However, given the lengthy
historical analysis the J.E.B. Court undertook in comparing race and
gender,265 the lower courts might not feel confident about extending
Batson to illegitimacy, the other classification subject to intermediate
scrutiny.
The ultimate value of J.E.B., perhaps even more significant than
its role as a guarantor of justice in jury selection, may lie in the
insight it provides into current equal protection methodology. The
tier system, designed to operate almost reflexively, was created to
ensure the sovereignty of the Fourteenth Amendment over actions
affecting certain classes that had been identified previously as being
at a special risk of discriminatory state acts. However, the mechanical
nature of the tier analysis also makes it difficult for the Court to
extend equal protection to groups that are not recognized as deserving
some form of automatic scrutiny.267 Once the Court recognizes a
new classification, even if it does so in only a narrow context, it tacitly
approves subjecting the classification to scrutiny in other contexts by
virtue of the tier structure. J.E.B. highlights the inflexibility of this
approach. In the context of the peremptory challenge, groups that are
264. There undoubtedly will be a renewed flood of claims requesting extensions of
Batson to prohibit peremptories exercised against other classes of individuals. See, e.g.,
Missouri v. Kelly, No. 46975, 1994 WL 449408 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994) (concerning
a defendant claiming the improper removal of three venire members by peremptory strikes
based on their age).
265. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
266. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 451 (1988); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72
(1968). As a practical matter, few trial attorneys probably ever inquire about a potential
juror's legitimacy.
267. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see also Teffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 passim (1984) (predicting the
collapse of multi-leveled analysis in equal protection cases); The Supreme Court, 1987
Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 201-11 (1988) (discussing treatment of
equal protection analysis during the 1987 Supreme Court Term); cf Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court A Model for Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RnV. 1, 17-20 (1972) (observing the Supreme Court's
dissatisfaction with the rigid dichotomy of the old "two-tier" analysis).
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a numerical minority in society are the most vulnerable classes
because it is easier for a litigant to remove all members of that group
from the venire.2" When the group in question also has been
subject to almost any level of historic discrimination, the stigma of
being excluded certainly is no less a "brand upon them, affixed by the
law"269 than it is for any other group. With a more flexible frame-
work, the Court might be able to recognize discriminatory exercise of
peremptories as abhorrent to the principles of equal protection,
without fear of setting unalterable precedent for nonjury contexts.
Instead, the Court has created a rigid structure with vague internal
components that often create confusion in the lower courts and an
appearance of vacillation on the part of the Court itself27 To the
extent the majority in J.E.B. may have been trying to avoid the
constraints of the tier system by retaining the Strauder-Batson general
equal protection principles as a partial basis for the opinion, perhaps
the Court is moving towards a workable hybrid; if so, it will need to
make this intent more apparent in future decisions.
In the aftermath of JE.B. v. Alabama, courts and commentators
once again will question the continuing vitality of the peremptory
challenge. No doubt some will take up the banner that the late
Justice Marshall once carried, and insist that the peremptory be
eliminated altogether.2 "' Stripped to its essentials, however, the fate
of the peremptory probably depends on two very practical, competing
concerns: the vigor with which its merits are championed by litigators
and the amount of judicial gridlock the recent limitations will create.
In J.E.B., the Court may have made its last statement about the
peremptory for some time, but it is worth noting that the peremptory
challenge in most instances is granted by statute2 2 and any severe
impact the Supreme Court's decisions have on the already sluggish
wheels of justice might induce legislative bodies to curtail or eliminate
the peremptory themselves. However, it is far more likely that the
268. For example, if Class X makes up approximately five percent of the population,
the venire in a given case is made up of 100 people, and each party is allowed 10
peremptory strikes, a litigant can easily strike all members of Class X if that is his intent.
269. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
270. For instance, the Court has never satisfactorily defined what qualifies as a
"substantial relation," the difference between "important" and "compelling" state interests,
or the difference between strict and heightened scrutiny. See also Shaman, supra note 267
at 175-77 (describing "internal inconsistencies" within the multi-tier equal protection
framework).
271. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J. concurring).
272. See supra note 1.
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peremptory will remain in place, damaged but still useful, and courts
and litigators will do what they always do when confronted with new
restrictions: adapt.
LANCE KOONCE

